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This study was conducted for the Naval Sea Systems Command's
Cost Estimating and Analysis Division, Code 017. Funding was
provided under the Naval Postgraduate Schools direct funding
allotment, Project Code M4L1.
This study represents a continuation of work initiated by
Willis R. Greer and reported in "A Method For Estimating and
Controlling the Cost of Extending Technology," Naval Postgraduate
School Technical Report # NPS-54-88-002 , Monterey, CA. , March 1988.
In that report, Greer:
a) reviewed the literature on the measurement of the state
of the art of technology,
b) developed a methodology for measuring the advance in the
state-of-the-art represented by a given development
program, and
c) established relationships between the advance in
technology and development cost.
Greer's research was conducted using a sample of 18 satellite
systems.
In a follow-on report, 0. Douglas Moses refined the analysis
conducted by Greer by using an alternative methodology for
measuring advances in the state-of-the-art of technology. That
analysis was reported in "Estimating and Controlling the Cost of
Extending Technology: A Revision and Extension", Naval Postgraduate
School Technical Report # NPS-54-89-06, Monterey, CA. , March 1989.
The objectives of the current study were, as stated in the
proposal document:
Determine whether an association between the degree to
which a new system is technologically advanced with
respect to it predecessors is an indication of the
production costs that can be anticipated. If so,
establish a reliable model depicting said association.
Determine whether contractors exhibiting high-quality
cost control can be distinguished from those who have
been less successful in controlling costs. Perform such
an analysis. Attempt to discover whether ex ante
determinable characteristics are present in contractors
which would allow predicting whether good or less-
successful cost control can be expected.
This final report is submitted in fulfillment of the agreement.
The report is releasable.
Although a continuation of prior research, this report is a
self-contained document. Readers who are interested in a general
review of studies addressing the measurement of technology are
referred to the Greer report cited above. Readers who are
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When various components of the Department of Defense (DoD)
enter into contractual agreements to procure newly-designed high-
technology systems, particularly systems which extend the state-
of-the-art of technology, there is considerable uncertainty
concerning cost. In order to control the cost of acguisitions, it
is important that DoD possess the ability to estimate the cost of
producing such systems.
Prior research has shown that useful measures of the state-
of-the-art of technology embodied in various systems, and measures
of the advance in technology from predecessor systems, can be
created. Furthermore, these technology related measures have been
shown to be useful in explaining the development cost associated
with creating new systems. (See Greer, 1988, for a review.) The
purpose of this study is to:
a) determine if technology related measures are useful in
explaining the production cost of high-technology systems
and develop a cost prediction model using the technology
measures, and
b) determine if factors can be identified ex ante (prior to
production) which are associated with cost overruns or
cost savings (measured relative to expected production
cost, predicted from the technology based model)
.
The analysis is conducted using data for a sample of military
aircraft produced during the 1950-1980 period. The organization
of the remainder of the study is as follows:
Chapter II describes the process used to select the sample of
aircraft and the methodology used to create both technology related
measures and measures of production cost.
Chapter III provides an analysis for explaining production
cost by technology measures. Regression procedures are employed
to construct a model. Measures of cost variances (cost overruns
or cost savings) are created by comparing actual production costs
with predicted production costs.
Chapter IV hypothesizes that cost variances are associated
with factors reflecting characteristics of the aircraft procurement
program and economic and political conditions existing prior to the
time of production. Findings from tests of the hypotheses are
presented.
Chapter V hypothesizes that cost variances are associated with
financial characteristics of contractors. Relationships between
cost variances and a set of financial ratios are described.
Chapter VI provides a summary and conclusions.
II. SAMPLE AND MEASURES
One objective of this study is to determine and model
relationships between technology and production cost. This chapter
outlines the approach used to create measures of the state-of-the-
art of technology and extensions in technology, and measures of
production cost, to be used in later analysis. The analysis is
conducted using a sample of aircraft as representative of high-
technology systems. Since the measures created are related to the
sample, this chapter starts with a discussion of the sample.
SAMPLE
The population for this study was originally defined as U.S.
Military aircraft. The sample represents a subset of military
aircraft for reasons set out below. The source of data was the
U.S. Military Aircraft Cost Handbook [DePuy, et. al., 1983],
produced under contract to the Department of Defense, which
contains a wealth of performance and cost data on military aircraft
manufactured from the early 1950' s through the early 1980 's.
The handbook contains data for 108 distinct individual
aircraft, identified by mission (fighter, attack, patrol, bomber
etc.), design and series. For example, the B-52C is a bomber (B)
,
design (52) , third series (C) . Where successive series of a
particular design resulted in virtually indistinguishable aircraft,
the handbook combines series into a single program (e.g., A-7A, A-
7B —>A-7A/B) . This reduced the number of distinct aircraft
programs to 80. Since the study is concerned with the state of
technology represented by high-technology systems, as reflected in
performance and capability (to be discussed in a later section)
,
it was necessary to reduce the sample further. The methodology for
assigning a performance measure to aircraft relies on a baseline
aircraft, the F-4B, which is used in both fighter and attack
missions. Aircraft designed for other missions (strategic bombers
and patrol) were deleted (n=19) . In addition, because the baseline
F-4B is a conventional take-off-and-landing (CTOL) aircraft and
performance is related to the take-off-and-landing mode, vertical
and short take-off-and-landing aircraft were deleted (n=6)
.
Finally when successive series of a particular design had the same
performance, it was assumed that no extension in technology had
been achieved and the later series was deleted (n=8) . Thus the
final sample consists of 47 distinct CTOL fighter and attack
aircraft manufactured from the early 1950' s through the early
1980 's. Table 1 contains a list of the aircraft programs, the
prime contractor and the first year of production.
MEASURING THE STATE-OF-THE-ART OF TECHNOLOGY
The literature on technology measurement offers various broad
approaches to determining the state-of-the-art (SOA) of technology
for a given set of related systems. 1 Each approach reguires the
knowledge of a number (n) of technology variables reflecting
See, for examples, Alexander and Nelson, 197 3; Dodson and




IBS PROGRAM COMPANY YEA!
1 F-89C NRUP 50
2 F-2C MCDN 51
i F-9F/H GRUM 51
4 F-84F REPB 51
5 F-86D NOAM 51
6 F-86F NOAM 51
7 F-89D NRUP 51
8 A-1E/G/H DOUG 52
9 F-1B/C/M NOAM 52
10 F-3A/B/C MCDN 52
11 F-86H NOAM 52
12 F-100A/C NOAM 52
13 A-3A/B DOUG 53
14 A-4A/B MCDD 53
15 F-6A DOUG 53
16 F-11A GRUM 53
17 F-1C2A GDYN 53
18 F/AF-1E NOAM 54
19 F-100D NOAM 54
20 F-101A/B MCDD 54
21 A-1J DOUG 55
22 F-8A/B/C VGHT 55
23 F-9J GRUM 55
24 F-104A/B LOCK 56
25 A-4C MCDD 57
26 F-105B/D REPB 57
27 F-106A/B GDYN 57
28 F-4A/B MCDD 59
29 A-4E/F MCDD 61
30 A- 6A GRUM 61
31 F-4C/D MCDD 62
j2 A-7A/B VGHT 65
33 F-111A GDYN 65
34 F-4E MCDD 66
35 F-4J MCDD 66
36 F-111B GDYN 66
37 A-7D VGHT 68
38 A-7E VGHT 68
39 F-111D GDYN 68
40 A-4M MCDD 70
41 A-6E GRUM 70
42 F-111F GDYN 7C
43 F-14A GRUM 71
44 F-15A MCDD 73
45 A-10A FAIR 75
46 F-16A GDYN 78













distinct properties or characteristics. Each approach combines the
variables into a single SOA measure which has a scale independent
of the scales of the individual technology characteristics (which
are typically measured in differing types of units) . The
judgmental weighing approach [Gordon and Munson, 1981] express SOA
as a direct combination of values of the technology




























= judgmentally assigned weights
V
i
= the value of the ith technology describing variable.
The first version of the model is a simple linear combination
of weighted characteristics, the second version is a multiplicative
form intended for use when one variable (Vj) must be present in the
system.
The measures used to reflect technology in this study were
constructed by The Analytic Sciences Corporation [Timperlake, et.
al., 1980] and rely on the judgmental weighing approach. They
determined two "figures of merit" for each aircraft. The airframe
performance (AP) score reflects the performance and capability of
the airframe and engine. The aircraft system performance (ASP)
score reflects the capability of the airframe, engine and the
electronics, navigation and weapons systems, i.e., the complete
aircraft. Each score is a judgmentally weighted function of more
basic properties.
Airframe performance is measured by
AP = B
1
x P + B
2
x R + B
3






R = Range and basing mode
M = Maneuverability
V = Useful speed
This formulation is an additive multi-attribute utility function
[Keeney and Raiffa, 1976]. Because values of P, R, M, and V are
expressed in different units, values for P, R, M and V for
individual aircraft were divided by the corresponding values for
the baseline F-4B aircraft. This results in all characteristics
being expressed as ratios, which can be combined into an overall
score.
Weights were determined by the consensus judgment of a large
panel of expert operational personnel. Weights were assigned such
that the baseline F-4B had an AP score of 10.
Aircraft system performance is measured by










S = Survivability modifier, reflecting susceptibility
to detection, identification and destruction.
U = Payload utility modifier, reflecting target
acquisition and target engagement capability.
N = Navigation coefficient, reflecting internal
navigation system capability.
BjfPjRjMfV = as previously defined.
Again, values of individual characteristics were scaled by the
value for the baseline F-4B aircraft, and expert judgment was
relied on for determining the functional form and weights of the
utility function.
Note that the individual properties reflected in the models
represents "output" measures of performance or capability along
distinct dimensions. This is consistent with the work of Knight
[1985] who distinguishes between structural and functional
technology measures. Structural measures capture physical
characteristics, i.e., "what the system looks like". Functional
measures capture capabilities, i.e., "what the system does".
Measures of function or output can be used to compare systems of
differing structure.
These two measures were taken as summary indicators of the SOA
of technology embodied in the aircraft, reflecting their functional
capability. Three technology SOA measures to be used in later
analysis were defined as follows:
1. Platform (Airframe and Engine) Technology (PLATTECH) = AP.
2. Flyaway Aircraft System Technology (FLYTECH) = ASP
3. Weapons and Avionics System Technology (SYSTECH) = ASP/AP.
The SYSTECH measure is derived from the two others and is a rough
attempt to capture the degree to which the technology in weapons
systems and avionics systems enhances airframe and engine
capability to achieve flyaway aircraft system capability. 2
When speaking of the three technology measures collectively,
the expression "TECH" will be used. Values of the TECH measures
for the sample are in Table 2
.
MEASURING EXTENSIONS OF TECHNOLOGY
Various researchers have developed methods for measuring
extensions in technology (see Dodson, 1985; Greer, 1988, for
reviews) . One common approach relies on the idea of the "year-of-
technology" [Alexander and Nelson, 1972; Greer and Moses, 1989].
In this approach, time is related to technology measures in a
multiple regression:
where













X, = technology measures
e = residual
A predicted value from the regression equation for an individual
system represents the "year-of-technology" for that system. If
the actual year a given system was produced is less than its year-
of-technology, it can be said that the system was produced "ahead
of its time" and represents an advancement in technology.
2Dividing ASP by AP is consistent with the idea that the




BS PROGRAM PLATTECH SVSTECH FLVTECH
1 A-1J 6.57 0.50837 3.34
2 A-1E/G/H 6.57 0.50837 3.34
: A-3A/B 12.84 0.83645 10.74
« A-4C 6.22 0.87621 5.45
5 A-4M 7.33 1.16235 8.52
6 A-4A/B 6.84 0.57456 3.95
7 A-4E/F 7.22 1.00693 7.27
8 A-6A 12.13 1.14015 15.83
o A-6E 12.13 1.84666 22.40
10 A-7D 10.73 1.50699 16.17
11 A-7E 11.59 1.70578 19.77
12 A-7A/B 11.57 1.04S81 12.10
IS A-10A 11.03 1.09882 12.12
14 F-1B/C/M 5.90 0.89661 5.29
IS F/AF-1E 6.05 0.89917 5.44
16 F-2C 6.13 0.63785 3.91
17 F-3A/B/C 7.30 1.25562 9.02
18 F-4E 10.17 1.37266 13.96
19 F-4J 10.31 1.29874 13.39
20 F-4A/B 10.31 0.90398 9.32
21 F-4C/D 10.00 1.00700 10.07
22 F-6A 7.60 0.99737 7.58
25 F-8A/B/C 8.40 1.00000 8.40
24 F-9J 4.72 0.85169 4.02
25 F-9F/H 5.00 0.85800 4.19
26 F-11A 6.35 0.91339 5.80
27 F-14A 14.44 2.18213 31.51
28 F-15A 12.11 1.33278 16.14
29 F-16A 11.56 1.35727 15.69
30 F/A-18A 11.60 2.19138 25.42
31 F-84F 7.65 0.65550 5.13
32 F-86D 5.31 0.69503 3.68
33 F-86F 5.09 0.79175 4.03
34 F-86M 6.08 0.93421 5.68
35 F-89C 3.72 0.66129 2.46
36 F-89D 6.72 0.8580S 4.05
37 F-100D 6.25 0.95840 5.99
38 F-100A/C 5.51 0.87114 4.80
39 F-101A/B 9.69 1.37771 13.35
60 F-102A 8.02 1.21072 9.71
41 F-104A/B 6.64 1.02259 6.79
42 F-105B/D 11.68 1.27226 16.86
43 F-106A/B 9.58 1.56221 13.05
44 F-111A 15.45 1.19482 18.46
45 F-111B 16.48 1.50546 24.81
46 F-111D 16.48 1.47998 24.39
47 F-111F 16.48 1.88167 31.01
10
As simplistic as this method seems, related work by Lienhard
[1979] tends to support the concept. His paper studied the rate
at which technology is improved, and how (whether) this rate
changes through time. He studied several forms of technology
(clocks, steam power, land transportation, low temperatures, air
transportation) over extended time periods. The most relevant
observation to come from Lienhard 's study was that the rate of
improvement of a particular technology, once established, does not
change. If this is correct, there could be some major implications
for the cost, and even the feasibility, of attempting to effect
technological advances "before their time". If a desired advance
could normally be expected to occur only by some guasi-naturally
established date, attempts to accelerate this process would be very
costly. Accordingly, the year-of-technology approach may be well
reasoned.
The essence of the year-of-technology approach is to relate
technology to time and use deviations from the time line as
indicators of the technology advancement represented by individual
systems. A similar approach is used here, but TECH is treated as
the dependent variable rather than time. (Since summary technology
variables are used, rather than many technology characteristics,
they can be used as the dependent variable with results that are
eguivalent but easier to display and discuss.)
Results of separately regressing the three TECH variables
11
against the year in which the aircraft were first operational
(YEAR) are shown in Table 3. Not surprisingly, in each case
coefficients for YEAR are positive and significant, indicating that
technology increases with time. The relatively high R2 values
indicate that time explains a large proportion of the technology
variance among the aircraft.
Plots of the three TECH measures over time are displayed in
Figures 1, 2, and 3. The A-6E is circled in the figures.
Observing Figure 1, we can see that the A-6E falls approximately
on the trend line. The technology embodied in the A-6E platform
was not in excess of the average state-of-the-art of platform
technology at the time of the A-6E's production. Figure 2 shows
that the weapons and avionic systems in the A-6E were advanced
relative to the average state of systems technology. The result
(figure 3) was a flyaway aircraft also advanced relative to the
average trend in aircraft technology at the time of the A-6E's
production.
These observations can be generalized to define three
variables reflecting technological complexity or extension:
1. STAND: the average state of the art of technology at the
time of production of a system. (For any individual aircraft this
is the predicted value from the trend line.)
2. ADVANCE: the extension in technology beyond the state of
the art. (For any individual aircraft, this is the residual from
the regression model, or the deviation from the trend line.)
12
TABLE 3























PLOT OF PLATFORM TECHNOLOGY OVER TIME
a •
50 51 52 53 Si 55 56 57 58 59 6C 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 7« 75 76 77 78 79





















PLOT OF FLYAWAY TECHNOLOGY OVER TIME
50 51 52 53 5« 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79
NOTE: « OBS HIDDEN
YEAR
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3. REACH: the total technology embodied in the system. (For
any individual system this is simply STAND + ADVANCE.) 3
Table 4 contains values of STAND, ADVANCE and REACH for the
sample for the three kinds of technology, PLATTECH, SYSTECH,
FLYTECH, denoted with prefixes P,S and F, respectively.
THE MEASUREMENT OF PRODUCTION COST
All cost data for the aircraft were taken from the US Military
Aircraft Cost Handbook (Depuy, et. .al., 1983). This section
describes the steps taken to arrive at a production cost figure for
each aircraft that could be considered comparable across the
sample. Determination of comparable cost figures were hampered by
three factors:
A. Costs were incurred at different points in time when the
value of the dollar differed.
B. Aircraft were not purchased singly, but rather in "lots"
of varying quantity.
C. Cost per unit tends to decline with additional units
produced due to production "learning".
Note, there are alternative ways of determining measures of
STAND and ADVANCE. Rather than using a trend line to reflect the
average state-of-the-art of technology, one could designate a
specific individual system as a reference point. Candidates might
be a) an immediate predecessor system or b) the predecessor system
with the greatest REACH (maximum predecessor technology) . The
technology embodied in either reference system would constitute
STAND, and ADVANCE would be measured as deviations from the
specific reference system. (Of course the reference system would
change as time progressed.) These alternatives were explored with
no material enhancement of the analysis.
17
TABLE 4
MEASURES OF STAND, ADVANCE AND REACH
OES PROGRAM PSTAND PADVANCE PREACH SSTAND SADVANCE SREACH FSTAND FADVANCE FREACH
1 A-1J 7.7244 -1.1544 6.57 0.95367 -0.44530 0.50837 7.9013 -4.5613 3.34
2 A-1E/G/H 6.8329 -0.2629 6.57 0.84505 -0.33668 0.50837 5.7825 -2.4425 3.34
; A-3A/B 7.1301 5.7099 12.84 0.88126 -0.04481 0.83645 6.4887 4.2513 10.74
4 A-4C 8.3188 -2.0988 6.22 1.02608 -0.14987 0.87621 9 . 3 1 38 -3.8638 5.45
S A-4M 12.1819 -4.8519 7.33 1.49676 -0.33441 1.16235 18.4951 -9.9751 8.52
6 A-4A/B 7.1301 -0.2901 6.84 0.88126 -0.30670 0.574S6 6.4887 -2.5587 3.93
7 A-4E/F 9.5074 -2.2874 7.22 1.17090 -0.16398 1.00693 12.1388 -4.8688 7.27
8 A- 6A 9.5074 2.6226 12.13 1.17090 -0.03076 1.14015 12.1388 1.6912 13.83
A-6E 12. 1819 -0.0519 12.13 1.49676 0.34990 1.84666 18.4951 3.9049 22.40
10 A-7D 11.5876 -0.8576 10.73 1.42435 0.08264 1.50699 17.0826 -0.9126 16.17
11 A-7E 11.5876 0.0024 11.59 1.42435 0.28143 1.70578 17.0826 2.6874 19.77
12 A-7A/B 10.6961 0.S739 11.57 1.31573 -0.26992 1.04581 14.9639 -2.8639 12.10
13 A-10A 13.6677 -2.6377 11.03 1.67779 -0.57897 1.09882 22.0264 -9.9064 12.12
1* F-1B/C/M 6.8329 -0.9329 5.90 0.84505 0.05156 0.89661 5.7825 -0.4925 5.29
15 F/AF-1E 7.4273 -1 .3773 6.05 0.91746 -0.01829 0.89917 7.1950 -1.7550 5.44
16 F-2C 6.5358 -0.4058 6.13 0.80885 -0.17100 0.63785 5.0762 -1.1662 3.91
17 F-3A/3/C 6.8329 0.4671 7.30 0.84505 0.39057 1.23562 5.7825 3.2375 9.02
18 F-4E 10.9932 -0.8232 10.17 1.35193 0.02073 1.37266 15.6701 -1.7101 13.96
19 F-4J 10.9932 -0.6832 10.31 1.35193 -0.05319 1.29874 15.6701 -2.2801 13.39
20 F-4A/B 8.9131 1.3969 10.31 1.09849 -0.19452 0.90398 10.7263 -1.4063 9.32
21 F-4C/D 9.8046 0.1954 10.00 1.20711 -0.20011 1.00700 12.8451 -2.7751 10.07
22 F-6A 7.1301 0.4699 7.60 0.88126 0.11611 0.99737 6.4887 1.0913 7.58
2! F-8A/B/C 7.7244 0.6756 8.40 0.95367 0.04633 1.00000 7.9013 0.4987 8.40
24 F-9J 7.7244 -3.0044 4.72 0.95367 -0.10197 0.85169 7.9013 -3.8813 4.02
25 F-9F/H 6.5358 -1.5358 5.00 0.80885 0.02915 0.83800 5.0762 -0.8862 4.19
26 F-11A 7.1301 -0.7801 6.35 0.88126 0.03213 0.91339 6.4887 -0.6887 5.80
27 F-14A 12.4790 1.9610 14.44 1.53296 0.64917 2.18213 19.2014 12.3086 31.51
28 F-15A 13.0734 -0.9634 12.11 1.60538 -0.27259 1.33278 20.6139 -4.4735 16.14
29 F-16A 14.5592 -2.9992 11.56 1.78641 -0.42914 1.35727 24.1452 -8.4552 15.69
30 F/A-186 14.8564 -3.2564 11.60 1.82261 0.36877 2.19138 24.8515 0.5685 25.42
31 F-84F 6.5358 1.3142 7.85 0.80885 -0.15534 0.65350 5.0762 0.0538 5.13
32 F-8 6D 6.5358 -1.2258 5.31 0.80885 -0.11581 0.69303 5.0762 -1.3962 3.68
33 F-8 6F 6.5358 -1.4458 5.09 0.80885 -0.01710 0.79175 5.0762 -1.0462 4.03
34 F-86H 6.8329 -0.7529 6.08 0.84505 0.08916 0.93421 5 . 7825 -0.1025 5.68
15 F-89C 6.2386 -2.5186 3.72 0.77264 -0.11135 0.66129 4.3700 -1.9100 2.46
36 F-89D 6.5358 -1.8158 4.72 0.80885 0.04921 0.85805 5.0762 -1.0262 4.05
37 F-100D 7.4273 -1.1773 6.25 0.91746 0.04094 0.9584 7.1950 -1.2050 5.99
38 F-100A/C 6.8329 -1.3229 5.51 0.84505 0.02609 0.87114 5.7825 -0.9825 4.80
39 F-101A/B 7.4273 2.2627 9.69 0.91746 0.46025 1.37771 7.1950 6.1550 13.35
40 F-102A 7.1301 0.8899 8.02 0.88126 0.32947 1.21072 6.4887 3.2213 9.71
41 F-104A/B 8.0216 -1.3816 6.64 0.98987 0.03272 1.02259 8.6075 -1.8175 6.79
42 F-105B/D 8.3188 3.3612 11.68 1.02608 0.24618 1.27226 9.5138 5.5462 14.86
43 F-106A/B 8.3188 1.2612 9.58 1.02608 0.33613 1.36221 9.3138 3.7362 13.05
44 F-111A 10.6961 4.7539 15.45 1.31573 -0.12091 1.19482 14.9639 3.4961 18.46
65 F-111B 10.9932 5.4868 16.48 1.35193 0.15353 1.50546 15.6701 9.1399 24.81
46 F- 1 11 D 11.5876 4.8924 16.48 1.42435 0.05563 1.47998 17.0826 7.3074 24.39
47 F-111F 12.1819 4.2931 16.48 1.49676 0.384 92 1.88167 18.4951 12.5149 31.01
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The raw data available consisted of costs and quantities per
lot. The following procedures were employed to transform the
available data into comparable cost figures.
1. All lot costs were converted to fiscal year 1981 dollars
using Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Comptroller,
composite price indices for major commodity procurement.
2
.
Cumulative quantities at the end of each lot were
determined by summing the quantities in all preceding lots.
3. Cumulative average costs (FY81) at the end of each lot
were determined by summing the costs of all preceding lots and
dividing by the cumulative quantities.
4. Learning curves of the following form were fit to the





Cq = Cumulative average cost for quantity Q
Q = Cumulative quantity
A = Cost of the first unit
(estimated by the fitting procedure)
B = Constant, estimated by the fitting procedure.
5. The cumulative average cost of producing 100
units, CAC(IOO)
,
was determined by setting Q at 100 and re-
entering the learning curve to solve for Cq.
This procedure is ad hoc but does provide a comparable average
cost figure at a comparable quantity for all aircraft, taking into
consideration the different learning rates experienced on different
19
aircraft programs. The result is an average cost per unit of
producing 100 aircraft. 4
Cost data was available for three separate cost categories for
each aircraft:
Airframe cost
Airframe plus engine cost
Total flyaway cost
The approach described above was applied to the three separate cost
categories resulting in three variables to be used in the analysis:
FRAMCOST: CAC(IOO) for airframe cost.
PLATCOST: CAC (100) for aircraft platform (airframe &
engine) cost.
FLYCOST: CAC(IOO) for flyaway aircraft cost.
Note that there is a direct correspondence between PLATCOST and the
previously discussed PLATTECH measure, and between FLYCOST and
FLYTECH. In these cases, the TECH variables measure technology and
the COST variables measure cost for analogously defined components
of the aircraft. FRAMCOST is a cost measure for airframes, but
there are no corresponding TECH measures. (Without an engine the
aircraft can't fly, so no separate measure of airframe performance
or technology is possible.) Technology measures for platforms
will be used when attempting to explain airframe costs.
Additionally, there are TECH measures for systems but no analogous
cost measure. Technology measures for systems will be used in
4,For discussions of learning curves and their relationship to
production cost see Kaplan [1982], Liao [1989] and Womer [1979].
For more detail on the specific procedures used to determine CAC
see DePuy, et. al. [1983]. The convention of determining CAC at
100 units has been adopted by other researchers. See, for example,
Dodson [1977].
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some of the tests explaining FLYCOST, since the cost of avionics
and weapons systems are included in the total flyaway cost.
Table 5 contains the COST measures for the aircraft in the
sample (measured in millions of FY81 dollars) . Missing historical
data for some of the sample aircraft resulted in missing COST
measures. Those aircraft were delete from further analysis. Table




UNIT PRODUCTION COST MEASURES
FHAHCOST fLATCOST H.VCOST SCTIES
1 A-1J . .
2 A-1E/G/H 1.212 1.557 1.703
3 A-3A/B 5.136 6.007 7.815 1
4 A-4C 1.669 1.895 2.100
5 A-4M 2.225 2.927 3.714
6 6-4 A/B 1.603 1.859 1.917 1
7 A-4E/F 1.875 2.436 2.675
8 A-6A 11.286 12.421 13.123 1
9 A-6E 7.656 8.883 10.846
10 A-7D 2.950 3.847 5.012
11 A-7E 3.901 4.855 5.000
12 A-7A/B 3.217 4.511 5.272 1
13 A-10A 4.196 5.748 7.272 1
14 F-1B/C/M 2.229 2.297 2.388 1
15 F/AF-1E
16 F-2C
17 F-3A/B/C 3.419 4.205 4.710 1
18 F-4E 3.649 4.479 5.919
1? F-4J 3.511 4.416 5.924
20 F-4A/B 7.202 8.802 9.613 1
21 F-4C/D 5.753
22 F-6A
23 F-8A/B/C 3.746 4.334 4.475 1
24 F-9J
25 F-9F/H 0.655 0.856 0.939 1
26 F-11A
27 F-14A 13.082 17.333 23.901 1
28 F-15A 10.252 15.446 19.356 1
29 F-166 4.045 6.069 9.641 1
SO F/A-18A 18.854 22.197 23.968 1
31 F-84F 6.520 6.020 5.943
32 F-86D 0.752 1.118 1.458





36 F-89D 2.471 2.831 3.496
37 F-100D 1.698 2.426 2.659
38 F-100A/C 2.939 3.709 3.856 1
39 F-101A/B 5.771 6.735 7.291 1
40 F-102A 6.802 8.125 9.206 1
41 F-104A/B 2.004 3.830 3.773 1
42 F-105B/D 10.047 10.952 12.280 1





47 F-111F 9.827 14.121 20.897
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III. PRODUCTION COST AND TECHNOLOGY
HYPOTHESES AND TESTS
The initial analysis concerns the association between
production cost and the SOA of technology in the aircraft produced.
Can technology measures reliably predict production cost? The
first hypothesis is that production cost increases with increases
in the SOA of technology (the level of technological complexity)
.
STAND reflects the average SOA of technology at the time of the
commencement of production of an aircraft.
E
1
: Production Cost = + f (STAND)
The second hypothesis is that production cost increases with
the degree of technological extension of a program. ADVANCE
captures this notion. 5
H
2
: Production Cost = + f (ADVANCE)
The third hypothesis follows from the mixed nature of the
sample. The sample includes some aircraft which are the first
series of a new design (eg. F-111A) and some which are follow-on
series of an existing design (e.g. F-111B, F-111D, F-111F) . It is
reasonable to argue that sufficient production learning would occur
during the first series of new design so that follow-on series
would experience some reduction in cost. Hence
H
3
: Production Cost = + f (first series of new design)
5REACH is a linear combination of STAND and ADVANCE and,
hence, redundant for testing purposes; it contains no additional
information.
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A dummy variable (SERIES) was created to capture this idea. SERIES
was coded 1 for the first series of a new design and for a
follow-on series of an existing design.
Operationally, the hypotheses imply the following multiple
regressions:
FRAMCOST = + f (PSTAND, PADVANCE, SERIES)
PLATCOST = + f (PSTAND, PADVANCE, SERIES)
FLYCOST = + f (FSTAND, FADVANCE, SERIES)
Following the recommendations of others (e.g. DePuy, et. al.,
1980), regressions using both COST and In (COST) measures as
dependant variables were run. Using the natural log reduces the
effect of extremes on the regression (particularly important when
sample size is small) . Additionally, regressions using COST as the
dependant variable were found to be heteroscedatic (larger
residuals at larger values of cost) . This violates an assumption
of regression that error variance is constant over all
observations, resulting in residuals that are not of minimum
variance. A common solution to this problem is to log the
dependant variable (see Neter and Wasserman, 1974) . Findings from
using the two alternative measures were similar, but the use of
In (COST)
,
produced higher R2 values. Those results (Models 1-3)
are in Table 6.
All models in Table 6 are highly significant and explain a
large proportion of the variance in production cost. All
coefficients for the STAND, ADVANCE and SERIES predictors are also
significant and positive, consistent with the hypotheses. The
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TABLE 6












1 F = 21.30
PSTAND .206 6.17 .0001 Prob. = .0001
PADVANCE .212 5.11 .0001 R2= .67
SERIES .363 2.07 .0233 Adj . R2 = .64
2 PLATCOST Intercept -.706 F = 27.71
PSTAND .219 7.36 .0001 Prob. = .0001
PADVANCE .198 5.35 .0001 R2= .73
SERIES .388 2.48 .0094 Adj . R2 = .70
3 FLYCOST Intercept .321 F = 34.19'
FSTAND .099 7.95 .0001 Prob. = .0001
FADVANCE .092 5.97 .0001 R2= .75
SERIES .446 2.96 .0028 Adj . R2 = .73
4 FLYCOST Intercept .312 F = 39.94
FSTAND .104 9.84 .0001 Prob. = .0001
PADVANCE .189 6.48 .0001 R2= .83
SADVANCE .589 2.36 .0122 Adj. R2 = .81
SERIES .329 2.55 .0078
* One tailed tests
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conclusion is that both the SOA of technology in general and the
extension of technology in individual aircraft explain production
cost. And the findings for the SERIES variable indicate an
important "premium" in production cost for new designs.
Note that Model 2 explains a greater proportion of PLATCOST
than Model 1 does for FRAMCOST. Since the two models contain the
same predictor variables, this result is consistent with PSTAND
and PADVANCE being surrogates for frame technology and measuring
technology SOA and extension for airframes with "noise".
Model 4 in table 6 is an alternative approach to explaining
FLYCOST by using the separate ADVANCE measures for platform and
systems, the two items making up the flyaway aircraft. The basic
conclusion to be drawn from model 4 is that additional explanatory
ability is achieved by substituting PADVANCE and SADVANCE for
FADVANCE. 7
Tables 7 and 8 display analogous regressions for two
subsamples: new design, first series and old design, follow-on
series, respectively. In general, the findings are consistent with
those from the full sample: R2s are high and coefficients are
positive and significant. Model and coefficient significance
All STAND measures, being predicted values from a regression
of TECH on time, are linear transformation of each other. Hence
FSTAND is included in Model 4
Each model was also run using REACH in place of STAND and
ADVANCE. R s decreased, but all regressions were highly
significant, indicating that a measure reflecting total technology
in systems does well as a substitute for the two separate measures
reflecting technology trend plus extension.
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TABLE 7











-.647 F = 12.90
.228 4.72 .0001 Prob . = .
.228 3.78 .0008 R2= .60
Adj . R' = .57




PSTAND .239 5.34 .0001




Adj. R6 = .60
3 FLYCOST Intercept .654 F =21.87
FSTAND .108 6.17 .0001
«
Prob. = .0001
FADVANCE .101 4.31 .0002 R2= .71
Adj. Rz =• .68
FLYCOST Intercept .426 —— ——
—
FSTAND .121 8.45 .0001
PADVANCE .198 5.08 .0001




Adj . R' = .80
* One tailed tests
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TABLE 8










-.499 F = 12.64
.174 3.40 .0027 Prob. = .0011
.209 3.31 .0031 R2= .68
Adj . R' = .62
PLATCOST Intercept -.398 ——
—
PSTAND .186 4.44 .0004




Adj. Rz = .73
FLYCOST Intercept .466
FSTAND .087 4.20 .0005




Adj. Rz - .73
FLYCOST Intercept .495
PSTAND .089 4.83 .0002
PADVANCE .222 4.82 .0002




Adj. R = .82
* One tailed tests
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declines some from the full sample, which is to be expected given
the smaller sample size in the subsamples.
There is one pattern of interest. For follow-on series
(Table 8) , coefficients for the ADVANCE predictors are larger than
for the STAND predictors. (This is generally not the case in Table
7 for the new design aircraft.) The pattern becomes understandable
by considering that new designs involve construction from the
"ground up" of a new aircraft. Both achieving the current SOA
(STAND) and extending it (ADVANCE) must be "paid for". A new
series of an existing design, however, involves only "building
from" an existing aircraft. Cost should then be more strongly
driven by the extension to the existing aircraft that must be "paid
for". In short, higher coefficients for ADVANCE for follow-on
series is a plausible result, and suggests that the ADVANCE and
STAND measures do meaningfully capture elements of importance in
explaining the production costs.
PRODUCTION COST VARIANCES
Predictions for production cost, given the technology embodied
in the aircraft, can be created by taking the predicted values from
the Table 6 regressions (Models 1, 2, and 4) and converting (un-
logging) to arrive at estimated production cost. Actual costs of
course differ from the estimated costs. Variances can be
constructed by subtracting (actual - estimated) , which can be
interpreted as cost over (under) runs, given the technology produced.
These cost variance measures are, of course, not measures of cost
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overruns or underruns in the most traditional sense of being
measured relative to a budget. Traditional variance measures most
frequently compare resource inputs (costs) relative to budgeted
inputs. The variance measures here compare actual costs with
expected costs based on output, where output is measured by the
technological performance of the aircraft. Table 9 lists the
actual costs (COST) , estimated costs (EST) and cost variances (VAR)
for the various cost categories.
Plots of the cost variances, arranged by REACH of the flyaway
aircraft (FREACH) are in Figures 4 through 6. Two aircraft are
highlighted in the figures, the F/A-18A and the F-14A. Figure 6
shows a large positive variance (cost overrun) for flyaway aircraft
cost was incurred on the F/A-18A. Figures 4 and 5 show that the
F/A-18A also experienced the largest positive variances on airframe
and platform costs, suggesting that these two cost elements
contributed greatly to the expensive flyaway cost. Figure 6 shows
the largest negative variance was experienced on the F-14A; it was
inexpensive relative to the technology embodied in it. The large
"savings" was apparently not due to an inexpensive airframe or
platform; variances in Figures 4 and 5 are close to zero. This
suggests that the avionics and weapons systems added to the
platform were cost effective. They enhanced the flyaway
performance of the aircraft substantially relative to their
additional cost.
The variances may be interpreted as measures of cost overruns




IBS PROGRAM FRAMCOST FRAMEST FRAMVAR PLATCOST PLATEST PLATVAR FLYCOST FLYEST FLYVAR
1 A-1E/G/H 1.212 1.7455 -0.5335 1.557 2.0889 -0.5319 1.703 1.9417 -0.2387
^ A-3A/B 5.136 9.4677 -4.3317 6.007 10.7262 -4.7192 7.815 10.6813 -2.8663
3 A-4C 1.669 1.6051 0.0639 1.895 2.0100 -0.1150 2.100 2.2091 -0.1091
4 A-4M 2.225 1.9808 0.2442 2.927 2.7128 0.2142 3.714 3.0508 0.6632
5 A-4A/B 1.603 2.6529 -1.0499 1.859 3.2692 -1.4102 1.917 2.9393 -1.0223
6 A-4E/F 1.875 1.9690 -0.0940 2.436 2.5112 -0.0752 2.675 2.8342 -0.1592
7 A-6A 11.286 8.0200 3.2660 12.421 9.7899 2.6311 13.123 10.7900 2.3330
8 A-6E 7.656 5.4811 2.1749 8.883 7.0180 1.8650 10.846 11.3311 -0.4851
9 A-7D 2.950 4.0890 -1.1390 3.847 5.2537 -1.4067 5.012 7.1770 -2.1650
10 A-7E 3.901 4.9069 -1.0059 4.855 6.2291 -1.3741 5.000 9.4962 -4.4962
11 A-7A/B 3.217 7.0675 -3.8505 4.511 8.9808 -4.4698 5.272 9.0227 -3.7507
12 A-10A 4.196 6.1827 -1.9867 5.748 8.5826 -2.8346 7.272 8.0499 -0.7779
13 F-1B/C/M 2.229 2.1777 0.0513 2.297 2.6973 -0.4003 2.388 2.9872 -0.5992
14 F-3A/B/C 3.419 2.9304 0.4886 4.205 3.5590 0.6460 4.710 4.7552 -0.0452
15 F-4E 3.649 3.6452 0.0038 4.479 4.6447 -0.1657 5.919 6.0153 -0.0963
16 F-4J 3.511 3.7550 -0.2440 4.416 4.7752 -0.3592 5.924 5.9135 0.0105
17 F-4A/B 7.202 5.4733 1.7287 8.802 6.7439 2.0581 9.613 6.7090 2.9040
18 F-4C/D 5.753 4.7770 0.9760
19 F-8A/B/C 3.746 3.6788 0.0672 4.334 4.5077 -0.1737 4.475 5.0313 -0.5563
20 F-9F/H 0.655 1.8028 -1.1478 0.856 2.2431 -1.3871 0.939 2.4442 -1.5052
21 F-14A 13.082 12.8392 0.2428 17.333 16.4507 0.8823 23.901 29.5799 -5.6789
22 F-15A 10.252 7.8038 2.4482 15.446 10.4991 4.9469 19.356 11.4349 7.9211
23 F-16A 4.045 6.8782 -2.8332 6.069 9.7101 -3.6411 9.641 10.2310 -0.5900
24 F/A-18A 18.854 6.9235 11.9305 22.197 9.8477 12.3493 23.968 16.7833 7.1847
25 F-84F 6.520 2.2941 4.2259 6.020 2.6750 3.3450 5.94 3 2.7068 3.2362
26 F-86D 0.752 1.3388 -0.5868 1.118 1.6176 -0.4996 1.458 1.7129 -0.2549
27 F-86F 0.887 1.2778 -0.3908 1.028 1.5487 -0.5207 1.095 1.7415 -0.6465
28 F-89D 2.471 1.1814 1.2896 2.831 1.4393 1.3917 3.496 1.6884 1.8076
29 F-100D 1.698 1.6247 0.0733 2.426 1.9849 0.4411 2.659 2.3624 0.2966
30 F-100A/C 2.939 2.0049 0.9341 3.709 2.4968 1.2122 3.856 2.7333 1.1227
31 F-101A/B 5.771 4.8455 0.9255 6.735 3.7839 0.9511 7.291 8.0596 -0.7686
32 F-102A 6.802 3.4071 3.3949 8.125 4.1297 3.9953 9.206 5.3472 3.8588
33 F-104A/B 2.004 2.5281 -0.5241 3.830 3.2009 0.6291 3.773 3.6381 0.1349
34 F-105B/D 10.047 7.3465 2.7005 10.952 8.7374 2.2146 12.280 10.8976 1.3824
35 F-106A/B 7.014 4.7065 2.3075 7.897 5.7648 2.1322 12.016 7.7213 4.2947
36 F-111A 23.510 20.5358 2.9742
37 F-111D 24.141 20.9804 3.1606
38 F-111F 9.827 13.7861 -3.9591 14.121 16.6080 -2.4870 20.897 26.3578 -5.4608
31
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systems. The following chapters address the question of possible
causes of the variances.
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IV. EXPLAINING VARIANCES - PROGRAM AND ENVIRONMENT FACTORS
Clearly defense procurement, particularly for major weapon
systems, is specialized in nature. Both the product and market are
not typical of products and markets in general. Major weapon
systems are large dollar items which may represent a substantial
segment of a manufacturer's business. Major weapons systems
incorporate significant innovation with state-of-the-art hardware
and substantial uncertainty in development. The market for defense
systems is unusual, with a single (monopsonistic) buyer and usually
only a few (oligopolistic) sellers. Pricing strategy for such
items is likely to be an important strategic decision.
Prices are determined primarily through a bid and negotiation
process. A bid is accepted and a contract for a specified number
of units is negotiated prior to production. Prices (costs to the
government) are specified in the contract and are based on costs
incurred ("cost plus") using some agreed upon formula. Cost
estimates and their source are disclosed at the time of contract
negotiation, so some agreement on the validity of cost estimates
is established up front.
When does the government pay "too much" or "too little" for
high technology systems? Or phrased alternatively, what conditions
are associated with positive or negative cost variances, given the
technology embodied in the system? Several factors might
influence the price that would be offered by the contractor, and
accepted by the government, and consequently have some impact on
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program costs. The factors fall into three broad areas: 1) program
characteristics, 2) the political environment, and 3) the economic
environment.
Several variables are discussed below. Each is an attempt to
reflect some feature of a program or the procurement environment
existing at the time of program initiation. For each factor, how
that factor might influence the prices that are offered by
contractors and accepted by DoD are discussed. To the extent to
which these factors influence prices paid, they provide possible
explanations for cost variances experienced. Recall that higher
(positive) cost variances reflect cost overruns and lower
(negative) variances reflect cost savings. Additionally, note that
prices charged by a manufacturer are costs to the government.
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Program Value . Larger programs may be associated with greater
risk to a contractor. If a program is "small", experiencing
unexpected costs or losses on the program, while damaging to a
firm, would likely not be critical. In contrast, unfavorable
performance on a "large" program could have significant
implications for the performance of the firm as a whole. Greater
down-side financial risk exists. Additionally, larger programs
may, because of their size and complexity, be more difficult to
manage and control. Greater managerial risk exists. Consequently,
it was expected that, as the size of a program (as measured by the
dollar value of the program to the contractor) increased,
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contractors would seek, and be allowed, a "premium" to compensate
for additional risk. 8 Hence, program value is hypothesized to be
positively associated with cost variance.
H4 : Cost Variance = +f (Program Value)
Number of Lots . Features of the acquisitions environment
preclude the use of a single, unchangeable contract covering all
units to be manufactured during a weapon system acquisition
program. Due to the complex nature and state-of-the-art technology
involved in major weapon systems, contracts may be revised to
accommodate design and production changes. Additionally, because
of the nature of the federal budget process, funding for units
procured under a weapon system program is reviewed and approved on
an annual basis. The result is that system procurement typically
occurs in stages under different contracts, each covering the
acquisition of a distinct "lot", consisting of a subset of the
total number of units produced. Contractors frequently "buy-in"
to a program with a low bid for the initial lot contract, and
attempt to generate a satisfactory return by negotiating more
favorable prices on subsequent lots once their position as the
manufacturer has been established. 9 It was expected that a
Regulations governing DoD procurement under cost plus type
contracts specifically authorize increased profit to the contractor
(resulting in higher cost to DoD) to compensate both for higher
contractor risk and greater utilization of contractor facilities.
(See DoD Federal Acquisitions Regulations Supplement, Part 215.)
9Buying-m with an initial low bid is cited by researchers as
a common cause of cost growth on government contracts. The ability
of a contractor to increase price after its position as the
manufacturer has been established is reduced if a second source
manufacturer can be set up. But problems related to technology
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contractor's ability to increase price would be associated with
the number of opportunities for negotiating additional contracts.
Consequently, a positive relationship between the number of lots
in a procurement program and cost variance was hypothesized.
H
5
: Cost Variance = +f (Number of Lots)
Defense Spending . What was the political and budgetary
environment like at the time a program was initiated? Were
constraints being imposed on defense spending? Were defense or
non-defense programs favored? It was felt that contractors would
have less incentive to offer a low price (and perhaps government
negotiators would have less pressure on them to demand a low price)
if the political environment appeared favorable to defense
spending. A positive relationship between cost variance and the
degree of defense spending (as a proportion of federal spending)
at the time of program initiation was hypothesized.
H
6
: Cost Variance = +f (Defense Spending)
Program Funding . There is inevitably some uncertainty
concerning the long run commitment of the government to individual
weapon systems. Long run plans may be made, but the federal budget
transfer, the existence of proprietary information and the high
cost of second source qualification and start up prohibit second
sourcing for the types of systems studied here. The impractical ity
of second sourcing places the sole source manufacturer in a strong
negotiating position on subsequent production lots. (See White and
Hendrix, 1984, p. 63 and p. 93.)
10Evidence from research on pricing strategy in the aerospace
industry (Moses, 1989) supports the conclusion that, as defense
spending increases, contractors adopt strategies that tend toward
higher initial prices for aircraft system.
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is discussed and revised annually. Programs that are supported one
year by an administration or congress may be cut in subsequent
years as the administration, congress or political conditions
change. To the extent that long run commitment to a particular
weapon system is doubtful, contractors may perceive greater risk
and demand a higher price. If commitment to a program is not in
doubt, contractors may have greater confidence that program
curtailment will not threaten returns and, consequently, offer a
lower price, consistent with the lower risk. Commitment to a
program is not readily measured, but funds allocated to a program,
as reflected in annual obligational authority, may provide an
indication of the government's willingness to commit to a program.
"Early" allocation of funds may reflect a strong initial
commitment. The initial year obligational authority for a program
was divided by the total obligational authority over the life of
a program to create a measure reflecting the proportion of the
project that was funded "up front". 11 This measure of early funding
was expected to be negatively associated with cost variance.
H
7
: Cost Variance = -f (Program Funding)
Presidential Party . The conventional wisdom concerning the
views of the two major U.S. political parties toward defense
spending considers Republicans (Democrats) to be biased toward
devoting resources to defense (social) programs. A more favorable
Research by Moses (1989) demonstrates a significant
relationship between the degree of initial year funding for weapon
systems programs and the adoption of low initial price pricing
strategies by contractors.
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climate for defense spending may encourage contractors to seek, and
the government to accept, higher prices for defense programs.
While congress has been generally controlled by Democrats during
the period of this study, the Presidency has changed hands several
times. A positive association between a Republican presidency at
the start of a program and cost variance was expected.
H8 : Cost Variance = +f (Republican Party)
Capacity Utilization . High capacity utilization, 12 ceteris
paribus, should typically be associated with a greater number of
active projects for a firm and a greater volume of activity.
Because of this, two effects may occur. First, fixed capacity and
corporate overhead costs may be spread over the larger number of
projects, resulting in a relatively lower cost per project. 1
Second, risks associated with a single project may be offset by
risks on other projects. This benefit from the offsetting of risks
(i.e., a portfolio effect) may permit a contractor to accept a
relatively lower price on a specific project. Given one or both
12Capacity utilization was measured for the aerospace industry
as whole, rather than for individual firms. Work by Greer and Liao
(1984) shows that industry capacity utilization is a better
predictor of firm pricing and bid behavior than is firm specific
capacity utilization. This result holds because, in a competitive
industry, individual firm actions are influenced by the actions of
competitors such that the "average" capacity utilization of the
industry appears to drive behavior.
13Consistent with this hypothesis, Greer and Liao (1987)
demonstrate that unit costs are inversely associated with industry
capacity utilization in the aerospace industry, when contracts are
sole source, cost plus type.
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of these effects, the degree of capacity utilization was
hypothesized to be negatively associated with cost variance.
H
9
: Cost Variance = -f (Capacity Utilization)
Inflation . Inflation makes future dollars worth less than
current dollars. When the inflation rate is high contractors may
compensate for its effect by building a cushion into the price they
offer in order to cover expected higher costs. If this effect
takes place, high prices may occur when inflation rates are high.
A positive association between the rate of inflation at program
start and cost variance was hypothesized. 14
H 10 : Cost Variance = +f (Inflation Rate)
General Economic Conditions : Economic conditions - growth or
contraction - may influence program cost. If the economy is robust,
demand for products should be relatively greater, opportunities
for alternative commercial projects supplied by contractors may be
more plentiful, and incentives to compete on price for a particular
defense contract may be reduced. When economic contraction occurs,
new defense programs may appear more appealing and the increased
incentives to compete for such contracts may result in lower
prices. A positive relationship between the rate of GNP growth at
Lehman (1988, Chapter 7) argues that the Program, Planning
and Budget System builds past inflation into future price
estimates; that contractors, aware of the upward bias caused by the
built-in inflation factors, automatically raise prices to the level
they know is permitted by the inflation factor; and that this
process guarantees price escalation. His discussion centers on the
acquisition of the F/A-18A.
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the time of program start and cost variance experienced on a
program was hypothesized.
Hn : Cost Variance = +f (GNP Growth)
Table 10 summarizes the explanatory variables and their
measurement.
ANALYSIS OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
To test the hypotheses that program and environment factors
affect the costs incurred to acquire high-technology weapon
systems, three multiple regression models were constructed. The
cost variances (FRAMVAR, PLATVAR, FLYVAR) , representing the portion
of cost that could not be explained by the technology in the
aircraft, were regressed on the set of explanatory variables.
Results are contained in Table 11.
Several findings are evident from the regressions. First,
all three models are significant and explain a fair proportion of
the variance in the dependent variable. Second, all of the eight
predictors (except Presidential Party) have significant
coefficients in one or more of the models, and, when significant,
the coefficient signs are as hypothesized.
The strongest results, in terms of level of significance and
consistency across the three models, are for Program Value, Defense
Spending and Inflation; these factors are associated with all three
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TABLE 10
PROGRAM AND ENVIRONMENT EXPLANATORY VARIABLES
Program Variables
1. Program Value: Average annual dollar value of a program
over the program's life. Measured in
1981 dollars (millions)
.
2. Number of lots: Total number of individual lots contracted for
over a program's life.
Pol itical Variables
3. Defense Spending: Defense spending as a percent of total





Initial year obligational authority divided
by total obligational authority over the life
of a program.
Presidential party in power at time of
program start. (Republican = 1, Democrat =
0.)
6. Capacity Utilization: Percentage capacity utilization of




Percentage change in Producer Price
Index-Industrial at year of program
start.
Percentage change in price-adjusted GNP
at year of program start.
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* Significant at probability < .10, one tailed tests
** Significant at probability < .05, one tailed tests
*** Significant at probability < .01, one tailed tests
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cost variance measures. 15 The conclusions follow from the
hypotheses: Larger programs, perhaps because they are more risky
or more difficult to manage, tend to be associated with cost
overruns. When defense spending is high, cost overruns tend to
result. This is consistent with an environment favorable to
defense spending leading to acceptance of a higher price by DoD.
Cost overruns also tend to follow periods of rapid inflation. As
suggested by Lehman (1988) , this may be due to an institutionalized
planning and pricing system that builds past inflation rates into
future cost estimates.
The Capacity Utilization variable is most significant for
FRAMVAR and least significant (not significant) for FLYVAR. This
pattern is perhaps understandable. Recall that the three costs of




+ Avionics and Weapons Systems Cost
+ Miscellaneous Cost
= Flyaway Cost
The prime contractor for an aircraft program will be in the
aerospace industry. So the aerospace industry capacity utilization
measure may be most directly related to the actions of the prime
contractor. The prime contractor typically constructs the
airframe, but subcontracts out engine and systems manufacture. A
15Of course the tests are not independent. Since flyaway-
aircraft cost includes platform cost, and platform cost includes
airframe cost, the cost measures (and cost variance measures) are
interrelated.
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high association between aerospace capacity utilization and the
costs directly related to the prime contractor's manufacturing
efforts (i.e., airframe costs) may not be surprising. On the other
extreme, total flyaway cost includes systems, which are typically
subcontracted to firms in the electronics industry. Conseguently,
flyaway aircraft cost should be (relatively) less affected by
conditions in the aerospace industry. Thus, the lower association
of FLYVAR with aerospace industry capacity utilization may be
understandable
.
The number of lots variable is also most significant in the
FRAMVAR regression and least (not) in the FLYVAR regression. A
somewhat analogous explanation may apply. The government contracts
with the prime contractor for specific lots. Hence, number of lots
is found to be associated with what the prime contractor
manufactures (airframes) . Arrangements between the prime
contractor and subcontractors to acguire electronic systems may be
only indirectly influenced by the number of lots. Hence, flyaway
cost, which includes the electronic systems cost, is found to be
unrelated to the number of lots.
In short, capacity utilization and number of lots may be
expected to more strongly influence prime contractor actions and
the strongest (weakest) results are found when explaining costs
most (least) directly under prime contractor control.
Broadly, the overall findings are consistent with the
identified factors (except Presidential Party) influencing costs
as expected. Aspects of the program, political environment and
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economic environment do reflect conditions indicating when cost
overruns or savings may be expected.
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V. EXPLAINING VARIANCES - FIRM SPECIFIC FACTORS
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate associations
between financial and business characteristics of manufacturers and
the cost variances experienced on the aircraft produced. Are there
systematic relationships between contractor characteristics and
cost overruns or cost underruns? The analysis here starts with the
premise that contractor characteristics are associated with costs
incurred during the production of systems. The objective is to
determine the nature of the associations.
The previous chapter documented that cost over/underrun
measures (cost variance measures) are significantly associated with
program and environment factors. The intent here is to determine
if firm-specific factors additionally help to explain
over/underruns . This means attempting to explain variance in the
cost over/underrun measures that is "left over" or unexplained by
the program and environment factors.
Residuals from a regression of Cost Variance on the program
and environment factors represent the cost over/underruns
unexplained by those factors. The regressions reported in Table
11 were re-run excluding the Presidential Party variable (it was
non-significant in all three models and consequently has no
explanatory ability) and residuals from those regressions were used
as measures of the additional variance potentially explainable by
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firm-specific characteristics. These residuals are the dependent
variable used in the tests reported in this section.
There are four broad problems to address in attempting to
explain cost variance by firm-specific financial and business
characteristics
:
1. Data Source: What data should be used to construct
measures of financial and business characteristics? Data from
externally reported, public financial statements was used. The
primary advantage is availability. The disadvantage is that public
financial reports provide aggregated company level data and in some
cases data collected at a division or program level would likely
be more valuable. The difficulty (impossibility?) of gaining
access to internal, proprietary records, particularly for aircraft
manufactured decades ago, was considered too great. Given the
exploratory nature of the analysis, use of readily available data
was considered appropriate.
2. Choice of Measures: Numerous measures of financial
condition can be constructed from financial reports. What set of
measures should be examined? An empirically derived set of
dimensions reflecting financial condition was used as a bases for
identifying relevant measures.
3. Timing of Measures: The nature of a contractor's
financial condition during production of a particular aircraft may
well have an influence on the contractor's ability to control
1 RTests using residuals from the Table 11 (eleven) regressions
(i.e., including Presidential Party) provide the same findings.
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costs. However, documenting links between financial condition and
cost after production has occurred only establishes an after-the-
fact association, which is unlikely to be of value in ex ante cost
prediction. Instead, measure of financial condition were
constructed using data from the year immediately prior to the
initiation of production. Hence, the measures were available prior
to production and reflect conditions in existence before production
commenced.
4. Hypotheses: Developing arguments concerning why financial
condition may be related to cost (and hence cost variance) is both
easy and difficult. It is easy to construct a "scenario"
describing how some aspect of financial condition may cause
actions by contractors to be constrained or facilitated, and how
constraining or facilitating contractor actions may affect the
costs of production and cause cost over/underruns. Unfortunately,
it is sufficiently easy that multiple scenarios leading to
contradictory hypotheses can result. It is difficult to specify
ex ante what hypotheses should dominate. There simply is no well
formulated theory of relationships between financial condition and
cost control. Thus, the objective will not be to provide
definitive arguments of how financial condition may be associated
with cost. A more limited objective, creating "stories" describing
possible linkages, will be undertaken. Then empirical tests will
provide evidence in support or against particular stories.
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DIMENSIONS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION
There is an almost unlimited number of financial ratios that
can be calculated from financial reports. The task was to select
some subset of possible ratios to reflect dimensions of financial
condition such that the set would be both comprehensive and
meaningful, while still being manageable. Most financial
accounting and financial statement analysis texts group ratios
designed to capture specific aspects of financial condition into
broad categories, but the grouping process is typically ad hoc.
(Profitability, Activity, Liquidity, Solvency are common
categories.
)
Empirical research using factor analysis of financial ratios
(Chen and Shimerda, 1981; Pinches, Mingo and Caruthers, 197 3;
Pinches, et. al., 1975), however, has identified seven distinct
dimensions of financial conditions that the many possible financial
ratios reflect. The seven dimensions are both comprehensive (they
capture most of the variance in ratios across firms) and stable
(the same ratios are associated with the same dimensions across
time and across different studies) . These studies provide an
empirically based taxonomy of financial ratios.
Table 12 provides a list of the ratios analyzed by Pinches,
Mingo and Caruthers, categorized by the financial dimension each
ratio reflects. While the 48 ratios listed in Table 12 do not
exhaust the possible ratios that can be calculated from financial




Financial Ratios and Factor Loadings Defining Seven Financial Ratic i
Patterns for Industrial Firm s: 1951, 1957, 1963, 1969
Factor Loadinc
Ratio
Ratio NameNumber 1951 1957 1963 1969
Factor One—Return on Investment
2 Total Income/Sales .43 .65 .30 .71
27 Cash Flow/Total Assets .79 .82 .78 .85°
28 Cash Flow/Net Worth .87 .88 .84 .91"
30 Total Income/Total Assets .94 .93 .91 .89"
31 Net Income/Total Assets .92 .92 .90 .89"
32 Net Income/Net Worth .96 .96 .98 .96°
38 EBIT/Total Assets .89 .91 .87 .91"
39 EBIT/Sales .51 .67 .67 .77
43 Cash Flow/Total Capital .85 .87 .84 .88"
44 Total Income/Total Capital .96 .97 .85 .97"
Factor Two—Capital Intensiveness
1 Cash Flow/Sales -.76 -.80 -.54 -.78''
2 Total Income/Sales -.79 -.56 -.25 -.51
3 Net Income/Sales -.79 -.57 -.02 -.51
4 Current Liabilities/Net Plant .08 .49 .81 .64
9 Working Capital/Total Assets .22 .86 .68 .66
14 Current Assets/Total Assets .27 ' .87 .87 .81 b
18 Quick jAssets/Total Assets .26 .62 .54 .77
22 Current Assets/Sales -.80 -.12 .01 -.11
34 Net Worth/Sales -.85 -.85 -.82 -.88"
36 Sales/Total Assets .97 .85 .79 .89"
37 Cost of Goods Sold/Inventory .70 .10 -.01 .10
39 EBIT/Sales -.73 -.47 -.42 -.42
42 Sales/Net Plant .62 .92 .95 .95b
45 Sales/Total Capital .87 .79 .76 .85°
Factor Three—Inventory Intensiveness
9 Working Capital/Total Assets .99 .48 .54 .47
14 Current Assets/Total Assets .88 .43 .42 .45 •
22 Current Assets/Sales .52 .91 .90 .87b CO
23 Inventory/Sales .64 .96 .90 .97" cx>
35 Sales/Working Capital -.71 -.82 -.89 -.77° H
37 Cost of Goods Sold/Inventory -.57 -.95 -.96 -.97b •>
Factor Fo ur—Financial Leverage
in
u
6 Debt/Plant .74 .66 .60 .73° Q)
7 Debt/Total Capital .99 .99 .93 .99" •p
8 Total Liabilities/Net Worth .75 .85 .91 .76° 3
u
(010 Total Assets/Net Worth .74 .84 .88 .76"
47 Debt/Total Assets .99 .96 .91 .97" u
48 Total Liabilities/Total Assets .75 .87 .87 .76"
•0
Factor Five—Receivables Intensiveness c
11 Receivables/Inventory -.99 -.99 -.99 -.99"
16 Inventory/Current Assets .40 .65 .71 .76c
17 Inventory/Working Capital .22 .52 .71 .46 c
20 Receivables/Sales -.90 -.89 -.80 -.82"
24 Quick Assets/Sales -.40 -.68 -.72 -.73c
Factor Six—Short-term Liquidity tn
5 Current Liabilities/Net Worth -.85 -.75 -.72 -.71 b Q)
15 Current Assets/Current Liab. .77 .82 .80 .91"
17 Inventory/Working Capital -.72 -.53 -.52 -.76c c
•H
19 Quick Assets/Current Liab. .75 .70 .72 .81" a<
46 Current Assets/Total Assets -.91 -.79 -.73 -.78"
Factor Seven—Cash Position • •
12 Cash/Total Assets .89 .87 .80 .91 a
13 Cash/Current Liabilities .74 .83 .82 .83" u
21 Cash/Sales .79 .88 .51 .90
b
25 Quick Assets/Fund Expenditures .73 .44 .27 .25 w
26 Cash/Fund Expenditures .99 .99 .85 .91"
a Loaded at .70 or greater in all four years.
b Loaded at .70 or greater in three of the years. 53
c Loaded at .70 or greater in two of the years.
For purposes of the current analyses, one ratio was selected
to represent each financial dimension. Each ratio selected had a
high and stable factor loading on the specific financial dimension
it is designed to reflect during the 1951 to 1969 period studied
by Pinches, Mingo and Caruthers. Thus, the selected ratios are
both strong and consistent indicators of the seven dimensions of
financial condition that exist in available ratios. The dimensions
and selected ratios follow:
Dimension Ratio
Profitability:
Asset Turnover or Capital Intensiveness:
Financial Leverage:
Short Term Liguidity:













There is one exception. Profit Margin (Income/Sales) was
selected to represent the Profitability dimension even though other
ratios (i.e. Income/Assets, Income/Net Worth) had higher factor
loadings. The reason for this is that Income/Sales is a more
"basic" measure of profitability. Financial analysis (see
Davidson, Stickney and Weil, 1988, Chapter 6) typically decomposes
return on assets (Income/Assets) and return on equity (Income/Net
Worth) into separate measures of profit margin, asset turnover and
financial leverage. Since asset turnover and financial leverage
are two of the other dimensions, use of a profitability ratio that
was unaffected by these two dimensions was desired.
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Financial data to compute the ratios for the sample firms were
collected from annual reports and Moody's Industrial Manuals.
Financial data could not be found for two sample observations (from
the early 1950 's) and those two observations were deleted from
further analyses. The ratios were calculated for the year
immediately prior to commencement of production.
HYPOTHESES
This section introduces some possible ways that financial
condition may be related to cost. Links between each dimension of
financial condition and cost are outlined. In general, the
arguments for a link between financial condition and cost rest on
two general ideas:
a. The measures of financial condition indicate positive or
negative financial or business conditions which have implications
for the management of operations, the incurrence of costs and cost
control
.
b. The measures of financial condition indicate conditions
which influence the nature or strength of a contractor's
negotiation position, influence the negotiated price and,
consequently, the cost to the government.
Profitability
This dimension is measured by Income/Sales. High ratio values
imply greater excess of revenues over expenses and greater
profitability. Possible links between profitability and cost are
as follows:
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1. Profitability results from an ability to control costs
(inputs) relative to revenues (output) and hence is a general
indicator of efficiency. This is true for both competitive and
non-competitive situations. In competitive situations, the market
sets a price for the output and profitability is achieved by
controlling costs to produce the output. In non-competitive
situations (i.e., sole source, cost plus type contracts) incentive
clauses reduce (increase) profit as costs increase (are
controlled) . Hence, a negative association between Income/Sales
and cost is expected.
2. High profitability serves to harden a contractor's
negotiation position and results in a higher bid being offered and
accepted. Two factors may cause this. First, executives are
frequently compensated on the basis of profitability measures and
rewarded for increasing profitability. High profitability in the
recent past establishes a high standard, which can only be exceeded
by continued high profitability. 18 Second, high profitability
reduces a firm's need for a particular program. Hence, a positive
association between Income/Sales and cost is expected.
3. High profitability is an indicator that a contractor knows
how to "manage" cost incurrence and cost allocation on government
projects. More specifically, high profitability is achieved by
allocating costs to government cost plus type contracts (where
costs are reimbursed) and away from commercial or government fixed
18A similar argument, linking profitability to pricing strategy
has been made by McGrath and Moses (1987)
.
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price contracts (where costs are absorbed by the contractor) . If
high profitability has resulted from such successful "management"
of the cost accounting process in the past, then high cost on
future cost-plus contracts (e.g. aircraft) is indicated. Hence,
a positive association between Income/Sales and cost is expected.
Capital Intensiveness/Asset Turnover
This dimension is measured by Sales/Assets. Higher ratio
values mean higher asset turnover but lower capital intensiveness.
Possible links between capital intensiveness or asset turnover and
cost are as follows:
1. High asset turnover indicates high utilization of
facilities. High facilities utilization means that fixed capacity
costs can be spread over more projects, reducing the cost incurred
on individual project, leading to cost savings. Hence, a negative
association between Sales/Assets and cost is expected.
2. High asset turnover (low capital intensiveness) indicates
that a firm is operating near full capacity, placing constraints
on the firm's capacity to handle large new projects. Costs
increase at full capacity due to such factors as overtime, dis-
economies of scale and the need for new investment. 19 Hence, a
positive association between Sales/Assets and cost is expected.
3. High asset turnover indicates that a firm is operating
near full capacity. The successful filling of capacity reduces the
19Franklin (1984) provides a short analysis of the relationship
between capacity and cost.
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firm's need for additional projects, which strengthens the firm's
negotiation position. The stronger negotiation position results
70 • • • •in a higher bid and price. Hence, a positive association between
Sales/Assets and cost is expected.
4. A high measure of asset turnovers is "caused" by low
measures of assets. Asset measures are low because the assets are
old and not being replaced. (Financial statements measure assets
in terms of depreciated acquisition costs.) Low asset measures
• . . i • 21 • •indicates out-dated, inefficient capital assets. Inefficient
assets lead to increased production cost. Hence, a positive
association between Sales/Assets and cost is expected.
Financial Leverage
This dimension is measured by Assets/Net Worth. High ratio
values imply more debt financing and greater leverage. Possible
links between leverage and cost follow:
1. Financial leverage (caused by large debt financing
relative to equity financing) is an indicator of solvency or long
term risk. High leverage implies greater risk, which implies a
high cost of raising capital. The high cost of capital places
constraints on the firm's ability to invest in capital assets or
productivity enhancing programs. These constraints result in less
20Greer and Liao (1987) discuss links between capacity
utilization and pricing.
21Many financial analysis texts discuss of the measurement of
assets using historical acquisition cost may have implications for
the conclusions to be drawn from financial ratios. See, for
example, Miller (1972).
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efficient production and higher cost. Hence, a positive
association between leverage and cost is expected.
2
.
High leverage results in a high cost of external
financing. Consequently , the contractor seeks financing via
progress payments from the government. The need for government
financing weakens the contractor's negotiating position. During
negotiation, price is traded off by the contractor in exchange for
more rapid progress payments. Hence, a negative association
between leverage and cost is expected.
Short Term Liquidity
This dimension is measured by current assets/current
liabilities. Higher ratio values mean higher liquidity. Possible
links between liquidity and cost follow:
1. Short term liquidity reflect a firm's ability to meet
short term obligations to creditors and suppliers. New projects
may require substantial outlays to finance inventories and
production start up costs. Poorer liquidity may result in delays
in acquiring necessary resources and other related costs (less
attractive payment or credit terms) . Higher liquidity may be
associated with greater ability to manage day to day operations,
reducing cost. Hence, a negative association between liquidity and
cost is expected.
2. Short term liquidity is an indicator of "slack" resources.
Slack provides a buffer and allows greater flexibility in
responding to unforeseen contingencies or taking advantage of
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unforeseen opportunities. This greater flexibility permits greater
control over the production process and reduces cost. 22 Hence, a
negative association between liquidity and cost is expected.
3. Poor short term liquidity indicates a need for additional
financing to support working capital requirements. Contractors
with liquidity problems trade off price in exchange for more
favorable progress payments, resulting in lower program cost. 2 '
Hence, a positive association between liquidity and cost is
expected.
Inventory Intensiveness/Inventory Turnover
This dimension is measured by the Sales/Working Capital ratio.
Higher values of the ratio mean lower inventory intensiveness or
higher inventory turnover. Possible links between Inventory and
cost follow:
1. The major inventory item for contractors is "work-in-
process", the value of projects currently under construction. High
inventory intensiveness means that the firm is currently engaged
in many projects. Overhead costs can be spread over the many
projects, reducing costs on each project. Hence, a positive
association between Sales/Working Capital and cost is expected.
2
.
High inventory intensiveness indicates that the firm is
currently engaged in many projects. Undertaking additional
22Bourgeois (1981) reviews the role that slack plays in
controlling production.
Macias (1989) suggests this tradeoff between price and
progress payments.
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projects may strain the firm's existing capacity. Insufficient
capacity leads to overtime and dis-economics of scale, increasing
cost. Hence, a negative association between Sales/Working Capital
and cost is expected.
3. Inventory turnover is a traditional measure of operational
efficiency. High turnover implies successful management of
inventories relative to sales generated. High efficiency implies
good ability to control costs. Hence, a negative relationship
between Sales/Working Capital and cost is expected.
4. High inventory intensiveness implies many projects in
process and less incentive to bid low to secure new projects. High
inventory thus implies a stronger negotiation position for the
contractor and the consequent ability to extract a higher price.
Hence, a negative association between Sales/Working Capital and
cost is expected.
Receivables Intensiveness/Receivables Turnover
This dimension is measured by Accounts Receivable/Sales.
Higher values of the ratio mean higher receivables intensiveness
or lower receivables turnover. Possible links between receivables
and cost include:
1. High receivables turnover is a traditional indicator of
efficient collection practices and the ability to generate cash
readily through operations. Good collection practices provide
liquid resources and minimizes the need for external financing.
The lower need for financing permits the contractor to tradeoff
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rapid progress payments for higher price. Hence, a negative
association between Receivables/Sales and cost is expected.
2. High receivables intensiveness implies a high amount of
resources tied up in non-producing assets. Poor utilization of
assets implies higher costs (higher collection costs, lost
opportunity cost) . Hence, a positive association between
Receivables/Sales and cost is expected.
Cash Position
This dimension is measured by Cash/Assets and a higher ratio
value implies a stronger cash position. Possible links with cost
include:
1. Higher cash permits favorable credit terms from suppliers
reducing raw materials cost and encouraging prompt delivery.
Higher cash provides flexibility in responding to unforeseen
problems or opportunities. These factors lead to more successful
management of operations and lower cost incurrence. Hence, a
negative association between Cash/Assets and cost is expected.
2. High cash may indicate unwillingness to invest in
productive assets. Building up cash at the expense of reinvestment
may be consistent with continued use of older, less efficient
assets. Less efficient assets imply higher production costs.
Hence, a positive association between Cash/Assets and cost is
expected.
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ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION VARIABLES
To test hypotheses that financial condition affect the costs
incurred to acquire high-technology systems, three multiple
regression models were constructed. Residuals from regressing
FRAMVAR, PLATVAR and FLYVAR on the program and environment
variables (from the previous stage in the analysis) were regressed
on the set of financial ratios. Results are contained in Table 13.
Several findings are evident from the regressions. First the
R2s of the models are noticeably lower than those from the
regressions in the previous chapter. This is not unexpected. If
there is any correlation between the financial ratio variables and
any of the previously examined program or environment variables,
the ability of the financial ratios to explain cost will be reduced
because the dependent variable in these Table 13 regressions is
cost that is left unexplained by the program and environment
variables. 24
Only three financial ratios have coefficients that are
significant at traditional levels. Profitability (Income/Sales)
and Liquidity (Current Assets/Current Liabilities) are significant
in all three models, while Capital Investment (Sales/Assets) is
significant in two. For all variables, the coefficient signs are
consistent across the three models.
24The models are not significant overall and the adjusted R
values are quite low. However both model significance and adjusted
R2 are affected by the inclusion in the models of the various
ratios that were insignificant. Excluding these ratios improves
significant and adjusted R2 , while having no effect on the
importance of the three significant variables.
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TABLE 13
COST VARIANCE REGRESSIONS - FINANCIAL CONDITION
Dependent




t Coeff. t Coeff. t
Intercept -2.79 - -2.66 -1.58 -
Income/Sales 94.10 2.50 *** 105.7 2.66 *** 108.6 2.48 ***
Sales/Assets 1.98 2.36 ** 1.87 2.11 ** .97 1.05
Assets/Net Worth .23 .42 .47 .82 .41 .64
Curr. Assets/Curr. Liab. -1.47 -1.82 * -1.51 -1.76 * -1.59 -1.72*
Sales/Work. Capital -.15 -1.05 -.17 -1.07 -.04 -.29
Acct. Rec. /Sales -8.43 -.85 -14.4 -1.37 -14.6 -1.33
Cash/Assets -1.75 -.50 -2.67 -.72 -1.38 -.36
Model statistic
F = 1.31 1.25 1.24 •
Prob . = .285 .316 .315
*
R2 = .27 .26 .24
Adj . R2 = .06 .05 .05
* significant at probability < .10, two-tailed test.
** significant at probability < .05, two-tailed test.
*** significant at probability < .02, two tailed test.
dependent variables are the residuals from regressing
FRAMVAR, PLATVAR and FLYVAR on the program/environment variables.
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The strongest result is for Profitability. The positive
coefficient is consistent with some of the arguments offered
earlier. Higher (lower) profitability is associated with cost
overruns (cost savings) . Contractors that are profitable may
negotiate from a stronger position, be able to secure a high price,
leading to actual costs to the government in excess of "should
costs" based on the technology embodied in the aircraft. The
findings are also consistent with the argument that contractors
that know how to "manage" cost incurrence or cost allocation on
government contracts achieve high profitability and this high
profitability is associated with cost overruns.
The positive association of cost with Sales/Assets indicates
that cost overruns are associated with high asset turnover or,
alternatively, with low capital intensiveness relative to the
volume of operations. This result is consistent with various
interpretations. Low investment in assets relative to operations
may signal a situation where a contractor has not been adequately
replacing productive capacity. The inadequate investment results
in cost overruns due to inefficiencies caused by older, less
productive assets or cost overruns due to dis-economies of scale
associated with initiating a new project when productive capability
is lacking. The result is also consistent with high utilization
of existing assets resulting in a stronger bargaining position for
a contractor and a resultant higher price.
Capital intensiveness was not significant in explaining
Flyaway aircraft cost. A plausible explanation is analogous to
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that offered to explain some of the findings from the previous
tests involving program and environment variables. Flyaway
aircraft cost includes, in addition to airframe and engine cost,
the cost of avionics and weapon systems, which are subcontracted
out. Perhaps it is reasonable that the capital intentiveness of
the prime contractor is more likely to affect the cost of
components directly manufactured by the prime contractor (i.e., the
platform cost)
.
The weakest (significant) result was for liquidity. Higher
liquidity is associated with cost savings. This is consistent with
higher liquidity permitting contractors to better manage
relationships with suppliers and creditors, and better respond to
unforeseen problems or opportunities. The contractor's flexibility
results in better control of costs.
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VI. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The objectives of this study were twofold:
a) To determine if the degree of technological sophistication
of a system and the degree to which a new system represents a
technological advance are indications of the production cost that
can be expected for the system. If so, to establish a model
depicting the association.
b) To identify factors, knowable prior to production, that
may be associated with good or less-successful cost control and
test for such associations.
The analysis was conducted using a sample of military aircraft
systems. The initial sample consisted of 47 conventional-takeof f-
and-landing aircraft, performing fighter and/or attack missions,
produced during the 1950-1980 period.
Data reflecting two summary measures of performance for each
aircraft were collected from prior research conducted by the
Analytic Sciences Corporation. These measures were for airframe
performance and aircraft system performance. These measures were
created using a judgmental multi-attribute utility function and
reflected such factors as payload, range, maneuverability, speed
and survivability. These measures were used to define three
summary measures of the technology embodied in components of an
aircraft: a. platform technology (PLATTECH) , b. Avionics and
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weapon system technology (SYSTECH) , and c. flyaway aircraft
technology (FLYTECH)
.
Independently, each of the three "TECH" measures was regressed
against the year in which the aircraft were first manufactured.
This produced a trend line (equation) of technology over time. Two
measures were derived from this process:
a) STAND - a measure of the average state-of-the-art of
technology at the time of production of an aircraft (i.e. the
predicted value from the trend line) , and
b) ADVANCE - a measure of the extension in technology for
each aircraft beyond the existing state-of-the-art (i.e. residuals
from the trend line)
These two measures (for each component - platform, systems,
flyaway aircraft) were used in later analysis.
Measures of production cost for aircraft were then described.
The cost used to represent aircraft cost was the cumulative average
cost (CAC) of producing 100 units. Calculation of the CAC involved
fitting learning curves to the series of costs for successive lots
produced for each aircraft. The approach was considered to result
in comparable cost figures for aircraft, given that production for
different aircraft occurred in different lot sizes and experiences
different learning rates. CACs were provided for three different
components of each aircraft: a. airframe cost (FRAMCOST) b.
airframe plus engine cost (PLATCOST) , and c. flyaway aircraft cost
(FLYCOST)
. The CACs were used in the subsequent analysis.
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The first objective was to determine if measures of the state-
of-the-art and extension in technology (STAND and ADVANCE) were
predictive of cost (FRAMCOST, PLATCOST, FLYCOST) . Regression
models established that both STAND and ADVANCE were highly
significant in explaining cost. R2 values for the regression
models ranged from 67% for FRAMCOST to 8 3% for FLYCOST. The
obvious conclusion is that technology related measures are
important predictors of production cost. Additionally, there was
some evidence that ADVANCE was a more important predictor than
STAND in explaining the production cost of a new series of aircraft
of an already existing design. This is consistent with the idea
that, for a new series of an existing aircraft design, it is the
extension in technology beyond the existing design that must most
strongly affects cost.
Measures of cost variances (cost overruns or cost underruns)
were then created by comparing actual production cost with cost
predicted by the models.
The second objective of the study was to identify factors
that might explain the apparent cost over/underruns. The factors
identified fell into three categories: 1) characteristics of the
aircraft acquisition program, 2) characteristics of the economic
or political environment when production commenced, and c)
financial characteristics of the prime contractor. Generally, the
various factors were measured prior to production. Hence, they are
knowable ex ante and may provide the basis for predicting when cost
overruns or cost savings may be expected. Regression analysis was
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used to test for associations between cost variances and the
various factors identified.
Eight program and environment factors were analyzed first.
Collectively the program and environment factors were able to
explain from 44% to 61% of the cost over/underruns . Observing
signs of the regression coefficients for the individual program and
environment variables, the strongest findings were:
1) Cost overruns occur on programs that have a large dollar
value. This suggests that large programs are more difficult to
manage or control, leading to increased cost; or large programs are
considered more risky and contractors are compensated for this
additional risk by a higher price (cost to DoD) being allowed.
2) Cost overruns occur when defense spending is high. This
suggests that a political environment that is favorable to defense
spending leads to higher bids offered by contractors and accepted
by DoD.
3) Cost overruns occur when inflation, prior to the
commencement of production, is high. This is consistent with
contractors building an inflation cushion into their bids.
There was weaker evidence that cost savings are associated
with higher capacity utilization in the aerospace industry (fixed
capacity cost may be spread over a larger number of projects,
reducing cost) and that cost overruns are associated with the
number of production lots (additional lots lead to additional
contracts and offer a contractor the opportunity to raise prices)
.
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It is interesting to note that seven of the eight program or
environment variables were significant explanatory factors of cost
in one or more of the tests and that the hypothesized relationships
of the variables with cost over/underruns were supported. This
provides indirect confirmation that the technology-based models
were providing meaningful predictions of cost.
Seven financial ratios, reflecting distinct dimensions of
contractor financial condition, were analyzed next. Again,
regression analysis was used. While it was easy to identify
dimensions of financial condition, it was difficult to specify ex
ante the manner in which financial condition would be associated
with cost over/underruns. Numerous hypotheses were offered.
Collectively the financial ratios were only able to explain between
24% to 27% of the (remaining) variance in cost over/underruns.
Three relationships of interest resulted:
1) Cost overruns tend to occur on programs manufactured by
contractors which have been highly profitable prior to program
start. One possible explanation is that such contractors are in
a stronger bargaining position and are able to negotiate a higher
price.
2) Cost overruns tend to occur on programs manufactured by
contractors with low capital intensiveness. This suggests that
adequate facilities are a must in reducing program cost.
3) Cost overruns tend to occur on programs manufactured by
contractors with poor liquidity. This is consistent with liquidity
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problems hindering the management of day to day operations, leading
to cost increase.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Given that the technology measures were found to be strongly
associated with production costs, additional attention to these
relationships seems warranted. One direction would be to attempt
similar applications in settings other than aircraft. A major
problem in addressing other applications is in the availability of
suitable data for measuring technology state-of-the-art and
extensions in technology. Hence, a general recommendation is that
efforts be made to develop and maintain such data bases.
Another area of potential importance is the measurement of
technology. Given that even the simple technology measures used
in this study were quite useful, attention to the issue of
technology measurement methodology may be valuable and lead to
improved models. There are various alternative approaches to the
measurement of the SOA of technology offered in the published
literature. A study investigating the alternative approaches could
provide useful insights: Do alternative approaches lead to similar
measures of technology SOA and extension? Are particular
approaches more appropriate in particular situations?
With respect to the factors that were found to be related to
cost over/underruns, there is much room for further work. The
findings here indicate that plausible relationships tend to exist
between program, environment or financial characteristics and cost
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incurrence. But the measures used to reflect these characteristics
were, at best, a first cut and need refinement. And true cause and
effect linkages between the characteristics and cost need to be
more fully specified. Efforts could be directed toward identifying
additional factors that might influence cost. And more refined
measures of the factors would be helpful. Access to internal
contractor data may be useful in this regard. Only after
additional work in this area is done would attempts to include
these factors in formal estimating models seem warranted.
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